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Abstract
Many cryptographic applications rely on random numbers at various stages of
the algorithm to assure the level of security expected by the analysis. Since truly
random numbers are difficult to acquire, a set of conditions is given which when
satisfied by a sequence provide numbers possessing the qualities of randomness
required for cryptographic applications. More specifically, bit generators are
discussed, as they can be used to generate numbers of any size. Pseudo-random bit
generators are the implementation of algorithms which generate bits satisfying the
requirements for cryptographic use. The type ofps~do-random bit generators (or
PRBG) which are discussed are called complexity theoretic. As the name implies,
the strength ofthe algorithm, and thus the level of security afforded the generator is
founded on the intractability ofa mathematically difficult problem. Ofthe problems
of this type, the three most often applied are: factoring, discrete logarithms, and
quadratic residues. These three problems for the basis for the PRBGs discussed:
BBS-generator, RSA-generator both ofwhich rely upon factoring, the discrete
logarithm generator over finite fields, and the discrete logarithm generator over
elliptic curves. Any algorithm which is able to predict the next bit from any ofthese
generators, is expected to be also able to solve the mathematically difficult problem
upon which the generator is based and has been proven for the discrete logarithm
cases. It is this implication which yields the cryptographic strength for any
generators ofthe complexity theoretic type.
I
Introduction
The subjects ofprime numbers, discrete logarithms, factoring, and quadratic residues
have been studied for many years, but it is only recently that they have become generally
accepted as useful for data security. This paper focuses on cryptographic applications of
the areanf theoretically hard computing. Although there are many aspects of
cryptography where the above mentioned areas ofmathematics have broadened the
horizons ofthose studying the subject, the purpose of this paper is to focus on a small
subset ofthese applications, the pseudo-random bit generator (PRBG).
The first section provides motivation for this study and an extended introduction.
Section two discusses the topics in mathematics required to study these generators.
Section three discusses the mathematically difficult problems which form the basis of
many PRBGs, as well as describing algorithms which solve these problems. Section four
describes the basic requirements a function must satisfy in order to generate pseudo-
random bits sufficiently random for use in cryptographic applications. Finally section five
discusses several PRBGs which meet the.se requirements. Readers familiar with
quadratic residues, elliptic curves, finite fields, and the notion ofhard computations may
wish to proceed directly to section four.
2
1. Motivation
Like many terms in the sciences and mathematics, the definition of the phrase "random
number" varies depending upon the application. These numbers have found their use
not only in areas of computing, but throughout the sciences. For instance, when testing
software, it is often important to input data that mayor may not be ofthe appropriate
type or magnitude. While a truly random value would be sufficient, they are rarely used
due to the difficulty offinding or generating them. In many cases, what is used is an
arbitrary value, yet there are areas where such values are insufficient. One area where
more stringent rules for random-like values are often required is the science of
cryptology. Cryptology is the science of securing or hiding data, and is split up into two
subjects: cryptography, the study of constructing codes, and cryptanalysis, the study of
breaking or cracking these codes.
Before the mathematical revolution in cryptology, the two main techniques for
securing data were, substitution and transposition. Substitutions are usually I-to-l or
I-to-many mappings; while transpositions simply re-arrange the order ofthe data. By
combining these two techniques alone, strong ciphers can be produced. In fact, DES
(the Data Encryption Standard) which was adopted for use in commercial and
unclassified U.S. Government applications in 1977, is merely that, a sequence of
transpositions and substitutions. It must be noted, that although this protocol for
encryption (DES) has not been shown to have any major holes through which a
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cryptanalyst (someone involved in the cryptanalysis side) may base an attack, a slight
change in"one ofthe substitutions or transpositions may be expected to yield a very
breakable code. In particular, though the id~ ofa transposition or a substitution is
trivial, combining these techniques in such a way as to provide a secure cryptographic
algorithm is a non-trivial task.
Cryptologists refer to the message which is being sent as Plaintext. Whereas,
Ciphertext is the encrypted message. Simple access to the ciphertext is no longer
sufficient to understand the message. It should be noted that although the terms for both
the original message and the result of the encryption have the word text in them, it is not
usually necessary for the message to be an actual text-message, binary files could just as
easily be encrypted by most modern algorithms.
Many modern algorithms do not rely on the secrecy of the algorithm itself to add
to the security ofthe cipher. The way security is often achieved is through the use of
keys; while the algorithm itselfmay be known, without the specific key used to transform
the plaintext into ciphertext, the algorithm is of little use. Keys are used in ciphers much
the way that passwords are used today to gain entrance into other software packages.
To encrypt a message in a keyed security system, you must enter both the plaintext to be
encrypted and the key to be used. When designing a keyed crypto-system, there are
three features which may be included. First, from a theoretical standpoint, if a certain
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length key is found to provide insufficient security for a particular application, one could
ideally choose a longer key which would provide the added security.desired (although in
practice, many ciphers which use keys are not flexible enough to allow for keys of
varying lengths). Second, from a practical standpoint, if a key is compromised (in this
case we are speaking ofa third party who gains unauthorized access to the key - rather
than the key becoming unknowingly modified) the authorized users can simply change
the key and continue to enjoy the security oftheir algorithm, without having to redesign
an entire new system. Athird area of importance is related to the first two, and that is
the simple fact that it is much easier to transmit and keep secret a small key, rather than
an entire encryption system. It is important to realize that although keyed systems have
allowed crypto-systems to evolve into much easier to manage systems, the generation of
these keys becomes an important topic; for since the algorithm is not secret, if someone
can guess the key, the system is not only no longer secure, it is completely compromised.
One method used in discussing the strength ofa crypto-system is brute-force,
which is a measure ofhow long it would take to break a system if every key were to be
tried, or more simply a count ofthe number ofpossible keys. One reason that this
technique is apparently attractive as an attack against many cryptographic systems is that
such a technique can require little knowledge ofthe system being used, while still being
able to systematically test each ofthe keys for a system. This technique is usually only
applied to block or stream algorithms such as DES mentioned above. The reason is that
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the number ofpossible keys for these algorithnis is often sufficiently-small that testing
each ofthe possible keys is plausible, or brute-force is the best known method for
breaking the system. It should be noted that plausibility is a notion which changes over
time. For instance, as recently as ten years ago, the DES encryption system was
considered immune to a brute-force attack, while today, such an attack can be successful
using numerous workstations and pes. Recent brute-force attacks have successfully
searched the keyspace for 40 and 48 bit DES, and are expected to complete the search
on the standard 56 bit keyspace through a distributed effort. For algorithms such as the
RSA encryption method, which bases its strength on the difficulty offactoring numbers,
or those based upon the Diffie-Hellman method, a brute-force attempt could not be .
expected to find the correct values, even given more time than the-age ofthe universe
and computational resources greater than those available in the foreseeable future.
Descriptions ofRSA, Diffie-Hellman and other cryptographic algorithms are presented in
[14] and [16].
.-
For instance, if the key were 100 bits long, but the middle 80 were always
known, an attacker would only have to try 220 keys before it would be guaranteed to find
the correct one. This problem is exactly that which was brought to the attention ofmuch
ofthe computing industry with the attack on Netscape's Navigator SSL or Secure
Socket Layer. The basic idea ofthe crypto-system employed by Netscape for an
encrypted method of passing information was not flawed, but required the generation of
6
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a secret key that the two communicating systems would share. In fact, the basic
algorithm for creating the random key was also not seriously flawed either, rather it was
in the implementation that a seemingly secure system was shown to be completely devoid
of security. To generate the key, the idea was to take a few pieces of information that
only one user could know, and create a seed for a standard accepted mixing function
(MD5 or Message Digest 5). The output for this mixing function would then be used to
create the key for encryp'ting data. Tlie problem in implementation was that the pieces of
information chosen were: pid (process ill), ppid (parent process ill), and time. It then
becomes immediately obvious that any attacker with an account on this computer could
immediately find out both the pid and the ppid, while the time could be narrowed down
to a tight window by watching when the initial packet was sent out. In fact, even
attackers without an account on the system can mount a serious attack since both the pid
and ppid can be gleaned from the system. But even if the attacker has no ability to check
these, their structure, as well as the structure ofthe time on the system, allows for only
47 bits of randomness. Abrute force attack on a key length of47 bits is in fact not only
possible but rather trivial with today's computing power. The result is that an algorithm
expected to deliver a key consisting of 128 random bits, provides only 47. It is
important to realize that this is not an example of inexperience, but rather a
misunderstanding ofthe importance of each phase ofa cryptographic-system. More
detailed information on the Netscape key generation can be found in Goldberg and
Wagner [4].
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A similar mistake was made by a more widespread and more widely respected
system, that ofKerberos [13]. Kerberos is the system, created at MIT, which allows
networked computers to remain secure by controlling access to the system and system
resources, described in [6] and [14]. The Kerberos system is incorporated into many
products, for example, NFS (Network File System). Although the key generating
problem was realized by the creators ofKerberos when the Netscape problem was
announced, it was surprising to many, that a product developed at MIT, from whence
many cryptographic techniques have started, possessed the same flaw as that of
Netscape, a company with very limited cryptographic experience. If a cryptographically
strong PRBG (pseudo Random Bit Generator) were used for both ofthese applications,
keys providing the security of 128 random bits could have been generated resulting in a
key and a code unable to be broken with a brute-force method even in the foreseeable
future.
Key generation, although an extremely important aspect ofmodem cryptography
is not the only use for PRBGs. There is one cipher which uses no keys and no advanced
mathematics which is in fact a perfect cipher; that is, given an unlimited amount oftime
and computing resources, an attacker could never break the code, it is called the one
time pad. The idea ofa one time pad is to encrypt every piece of information
individually with a separate key, and while many examples show the use by encrypting .an
ASCn letter using another ASCn letter as the key, one can easily adapt the algorithm to
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be used with bit-wise rather than character wise encryption. While the implementation
can use many types offunctions to use a bit from the key to encrypt the bit from the
plaintext, the exclusive-or operation works quite well. The example below will help to
illustrate the system:
plaintext (binary)
key1 (binary)
ciphertext (binary)
key2(binary)
plaintext2 (binary)
key3(binary)
plaintext3 (binary)
: 1010001001001
: 1100101100010
: 0110100101011
: 1001011101011
: 1111111000000
: 0110100010100
: 0000000111111
Notice, to create the ciphertext, simply take each bit ofthe plaintext and combine the
appropriate bit ofthe key using the exclusive-or function. It is easy to see, once can
easily re-construct the original plaintext by combining the correct key (key 1) with the
ciphertext using the very same exclusive-or function. The next two portions ofthe
example illustrate that since to the attacker, the key is unknown, the sequences labeled
plaintext2 and plaintext3 are just as likely if the keys were key2 and key3 respectively.
Since the keys are generated randomly, not only are all of the above 3 keys equally
likely, any sequence ofbinary digits oflength 13 is equally likely to be the correct
original plaintext message. This is the reason that this is called the only perfect cipher,
any possible sequence ofbinary digits ofthe proper"length is possibly the correct original
plaintext from any ciphertext.
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Two problems become obvious when looking at this system: first, since the key
has to be the same length as the plaintext to afford this perfect security, long keys must
be stored for use by both parties to be able to send longer messages or multiple short
messages (note that re-use oftbe keys completely nullifies the strength of this algorithm).
Second, since for the system to be secure, random bits must be generated for the keys,
there is the problem offinding truly random sources. While the first problem of secure
storage and distribution ofthe keys is an important one, it will not be addressed except
to say that PRBGs help by reducing the amount ofdata required to be distributed or
stored. It is the issue of more quickly generating cryptographically strong pseudo-
random bits without a truly random source which will be the focus for much ofthe rest
ofthis paper.
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2. Introductory Mathematics
Much of the work in modem cryptography requires the use of higher mathematics.
While modem number theory is often necessary to create new cryptographic codes or to
cryptanalyze current codes, only the few important results from the areas of number
theory and modem algebra will be presented which are required for understanding the
PRBGs discussed in the following sections. There are two groups which most ofour
mathematics will be concerned with: finite field of p-elements, and elliptic curves. In the
next section, we will find that the finite field of p-elements has more properties than
those ofa group. Yet for the purposes ofconstructing PRBGs, it is mainly the aspects
ofthe cyclic multiplicative group which we will find most useful. The other features will
be thoroughly discussed, as they are required in order to construct some ofthe methods
for attacking the generators. Also, when we say that elliptic curves are the other group
we are concerned with, we mean the points on an elliptic curve, when confining the
curve to a finite field, and in our case, a specific type offinite field. Since both cyclic
groups require an understanding offinite fields, we will begin by explaining the important
parts oftheir structure.
2.1 Finite Field Mathematics
A finite field ofp-elements wherep is an odd prime will be denoted using the symbol Fp,
and for example, a finite field of41 elements would be written as F41 . Every finite field
can be associated with an odd primep or with the prime p=2. Ofthese two main types
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of finite fields, the fields with 2k elements are particularly well suited to machine
computation on today's hardware. Yet for our purposes, we will focus on finite fields
constructed with a prime number of elements as they are the basis for most of the theory
and algorithms in our current study. The numbers in this finite field may be represented
by the ordinary numbers, 0;1,2...p-1. One feature which defines a field is that both the
multiplication and addition operations are well defined. For example, in F11 with
elements represented by 0,1,2,... ,10, to perform addition, we may often perform
ordinary integer addition, for example 2+3=5,4+5=9. Ifwe use integer addition on
some elements we run into an apparent problem, for example, 7+8=15, yet 15 is not in
our field of 11 elements. The way we account for this is to consider addition modulo the
prime ofthe field. For example, 7+8=15=4(mod 11). In fact, the modulo operator will
be required to define both addition and multiplication for our finite field. Thus, when we
use the addition and multiplication operators on elements in a finite field, we will always
consider the operations modulo the prime which is the basis for the specific field we are
concerned with. In reality, the numbers we are considering as comprising our field are
only representatives of equivalence classes. The following are examples of equivalence
classes mod 11
...,-33,-22,-11,0,11,22,33, .
... ,-32,-21,-10,1,12,23,34, .
...-23,-12,-1,10,21,32,43,...
12
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To form the elements our finite field Fib we must choose one element from each of the
equivalence classes. For simplicity we consider the elements 0,1, .. .10 as representatives
oftheir equivalence classes, and thus the elements in our finite field.
Another feature ofthe finite field that we must be concerned with is the order of
the field. For the types offinite fields we are looking at, this is rather trivial, as the order
is equivalent to the prime number we selected for the modulo function. When we are
using multiplication, we actually use one fewer elements, we leave out the element O.
Not only can we exclude this element without incurring any inconsistencies, as no two
elements when multiplied together can yield a multiple ofour selected prime, we must
exclude this element in order to ensure each element has a well defined multiplicative
inverse. We also note that a finite field has the usual elements acting as the additive and
multiplicative identities as the integers, °and 1 respectively. Since we have defined the
multiplicative and additive identities, we would like to ensure the inverses for each
element in the field under either operation, with the exception of 0 which is not
considered for multiplication. The additive inverses are trivial to find, to find the
additive inverse for a simply negate the value as in case of ordinary integers, thus -a
becomes the inverse. But since ifa is in our field and is not equal to the additive identity
element 0, -a will not be in the field. We simply find the appropriate representative
element from the equivalence class; or more easily simply add the prime order to the
element, so -a=p-a. Determining the multiplicative inverses is a slightly more
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complicated task. For the fields we are working with we would like to use an extension
ofEuclid's Algorithm for finding the greatest common divisors of two integers. Euclid's
Algorithm requires that neither integer divides the other; for our use, this condition is
satisfied, since one ofthe numbers for which we will be applying the algorithm on is the
prime, and the other is the element whose inverse we wish to determine. The first step,
is to write the prime as
with O£"o<a. We then find values so as to rewrite a as
with O~l<rO. We then find values so as to rewrite ro as
again with O£"2<rl. We continue this process until for some k, rk=O so
rk-3 = rk-2qk-l +rk-l
rk-2 = rk-lqk +rk
rk-l =rkqk+l +O.
In Euclid's algorithm, the number rk is the greatest common divisor ofp and a. But we
are not specifically interested in the greatest common divisor since we have already
noted that the value will always be 1, so we start to backtrack the algorithm and re-write
the next to the last equation as
We then note that we can do the same with the equation above to find
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We can then substitute this equation into the one we found before to be left with
by combining like terms we are left with
We continue to rewrite the equations from Euclid's Algorithm and substitute them into
this equation in the order reverse from that oftheir generation. When the first equation
has been rewritten and substituted in, the resulting equation will be of the form
rk = a .w +p' v.
But since in our field, [7=0 and since we have determined that rk=1,
l=a·w
so
We will work through a small example to more clearly display the method. We
wish to find the multiplicative inverse of25 inF211. We start by writing our first
. .
equation as
211 = 25 .8+11.
We then continue with the algorithm until we have a remainder 0
25 = 11·2+3
11=3·3+2
3=2·1+1
2=1·2+0
15
Now that we have a remainder ofO, we check the next to the last equation and see that
the remainder is 1, thus the gcd(2II,25) is 1; a fact we knew since 25 is smaller than the
prime 211. We then work backwards to construct the inverse starting by rewriting the
next to the last equation as
1=3-2·1.
By substituting a re-written second equation we are left with
1= 3- (11- 3·3)·1 = 4·3 -11
continuing this process we calculate
1= 4· (25 -11· 2) -11 = 4·25 - 9 ·11
1= 4·25 - 9· (211- 25·8)
which when rewritten becomes
1= 76·25 - 9·211.
From this we can easily see that 76·25 == I(mod 211), therefore
25-1 == 76(mod21l).
There has been some work done in this area to improve this method,.or to devise a
different method for calculating the multiplicative inverses, but this technique is widely
used, and is used specifically for many implementations of the finite field structure when
implementing PRBGs.
A related idea is that ofZn which is a ring of integers. A ring has fewer
properties than a field, most notably, there need not be multiplicative inverses. In
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general, rings need not have a multiplicative identity either, although the ring Zn does in
fact have the usual one. Addition and multiplication on Zn is the same as that ofthe
finite field above, noting that n need not be a prime. The other important point to note is
that over a ring, two non-zero elements could have a product whose value is zero. For
example in Z12, 4·6 =O. Such a ring also does not guarantee that each element have an
inverse. Ifwe exclude the elements which have prime factors in common with our value
ofn, we can avoid such problems. This new collection forms a multiplicative group and
Another important result with respect to the finite fields, is called the Chinese
Remainder Theorem. This theorem is used to simplify the solving ofa difficult
congruence, by generating a system ofcongruences and solving them in such a way as to
provide a solution to the general problem. The situation which will give rise to the use
ofthis technique is the following, we would like to solve some equation for
x == amodn
but instead ofattacking this problem directly, we instead factor n
k
n= flq{i
;=0
(
where the qi are the k distinct factors ofn, and solve the problem for each ofthe powers
of the factors ofour composite number n. The Chinese Remainder Theorem then not
only ensures us a solution, but provides a means ofgenerating it. First we will describe
17
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the algorithm for finding the solution, then we will work through an example to illustrate
the technique. First, we must solve whatever problem we wish to solve using each ofthe
powers of prime factors ofour composite number as the modulus. This leaves us with a
series ofk congruences
x == Ql (mod 11lJ.)
x == Q2(modm2)
where we could substitute mj = qjCj to attack a problem in the manner described above.
For the Chinese Remainder Theorem to provide a unique solution, it requires
only that each ofthe mj are relatively prime to each other, as we described our factoring
method above as the impetus for our discussion, it is easy to see that each ofthe mj are
relatively prime as they are powers of distinct primes. We notice that
k
n= IImj.
j=1
The formula determining the solution mod n can be defined as
k
x = LQjMjYj modn
j=1
with the Q p M j,Yj to be defined below. Obviouslyaj are those from the system of
congruences above. Then we define
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and we are assured a solution for Yi since mj and M j are relatively prime, and we can
use the Euclidean algorithm described above to find it. A further description of the
method, and a proofofthe uniqueness of the solution can be found in, Stinson [16].
We will now work through an example to illustrate the algorithm. We will let
n=60 so, for our use, ml = 5, m2 = 4, m3 = 3. We will also choose al = 2, a2 = 3, a3 = 2.
Thus, our system ofequations is
x == 2(modS)
x == 3(mod4)
x == 2(mod3).
We next calculate
and
We then calculate x(mod n)using the Chinese Remainder Theorem formula
x == (12·3· 2) +(15·3· 3) +(20· 2· 2)(mod60) = 47.
We can quickly check that each ofour congruences in our system ofcongruences is still
valid
47 == 2(mod5)
47 == 3(mod4)
47 == 2(mod 3).
19
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2.2 Fermat's Little Theorem
We will now mention one more theorem from elementary number theory before moving
on to study elliptic curves, and that is Fermat's Little Theorem. The general form ofthis
theorem can be stated as
af/J(m) == l(mod m)
where a and m are integers, a is relatively prime to m, and rp(m) is the Euler phi
function. The proof and further discussion can be found in [8]. For our purposes, we
will be applying this theorem only in certain situations for which m is always prime,
therefore, any integer a such that O::;a<m will be relatively prime to m. We also will note
that for any prime number m, rp(m)=m-l. We then are left with are-statement ofthe
above theorem for m as a prime number
am-I == l(mod m) .
2.3 Elliptic curve mathematics
r
We now will move oil to a discussion ofthe arithmetic and structure ofelliptic curves.
We will be concerned only with elliptic curves when considered over a finite field, and
more specifically over a finite field ofthe form Fp. An elliptic curve is defined as the set
ofpoints satisfying an equation ofthe type
20
with a,b EFp and p>3, and so that 4a3 +27b2 7= O. We note, that although the ordinary
integer operators are used, we are considering the addition and multiplication operations
as defined over a finite field, as discussed above. Another point must be added which is
the additive identity element, in the case ofelliptic curves, it is called the point at infinity
and we will denoted it as O. The set ofpoints (x,y) which satisfy this equation are all
points in our group with x,yEFp satisfying the above relation, and this point at infinity
comprise the elements in the cyclic group ofthe elliptic curve, called E. The basic
operation over these points is addition. As we noted above, there is an additive identity
o which means that ifP is any point in our group,
P+O=O+P=P.
Much like in our finite field ofp-elements discussed above, each element in the finite
field has an inverse and is defined as
-(X,y) =(x,-y),
where -y is the additive inverse in the finite field, therefore it is the element -y (mod p).
The next definition must be ofthe addition of elements in the group where
neither ofthe elements are the point O. There are specific equations which define the
addition algorithm which are presented below to add two arbitrary points on the curve P
and Qwith
21
If the two points are inverses, that is, ifXI=X2 and YI=-Y2 then P + Q = 0, otherwise
X3 =A? - Xl - x2
Y3 =A(XI -x3)- Yl
and
A=
Y2 - YI ,if(P*Q)
x2 -xl
2
3XI +a ,if(P =Q)
2YI
As with our other cyclic group in Fp we also need to study the order ofthe
group. This is one calculation which is often much more difficult than that required for
our previous finite fields. Since we are discussing elliptic curves over a finite field Fp our
elliptic curve will have approximately p elements. There are upper and lower bounds on
this number by a result ofHasse, which states
p +1-2JP ~ lEI ~ p +1+2JP
where lEI is the order, or number ofelements [8]. Although this provides a bound for
the order ofthe points on the curve, for many ofthe applications we will be discussing,
the exact order is necessary rather than this rough approximation. An algorithm by
Schoofcomputes just this. The only problem with this algorithm is the speed with which
it calculates the order; the algorithm has a running time of O((log pt) [8]. This is
considered an efficient algorithm since it runs in polynomial time in log p, yet for large
prime integers p, the algorithm may not be practical. Much work has been done on this
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original algorithm to increase its efficiency, and a modified version of Schoofs original
work still remains the most efficient deterministic algorithm for calculating the order of
points on an elliptic curve over Fp• There are some curves for which the order is more
simple to calculate, and we will note them as they are the types will be specifically used
in the construction of our PRBG. For elliptic curves over finite fields ofthe form Fp
where p is a prime greater than 3, elliptic curves ofthe form
have exactlyp solutions ofthe form (x,y), as well as the point at infinity, in Bender and
Castagnoli [1]. Curves ofthis form are part ofthe collection of curves called
supersingular.
2.4 Quadratic Residues
The idea of quadratic residues over finite fields, is a specific form ofmultiplication over
Zo. A number aEZo is called a quadratic residue, if there exists some other number b
such that
b EZn and b2 ::a(modn).
To illustrate the point, the quadratic residues for ZIS are shown·below with the elements
whose square is equal to that residue lis.ted to the right of each
1: 1,4,11,14
4: 2, 7, 8, 13
6:6,9
9: 3, 12
10: 5, 10
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We mentioned in the above section in our discussion Of rings, for many applications we
would like to exclude elements which share a factor with our modulus, in our case above
15, and also to exclude the zero element. The elements we would be interested in, when
excluding these elements, would then be the set {I, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}. Of these
values, the quadratic residues are only {I, 4} and our list above is restricted to the first
two lines. We will leave this topic for now, but will return to it in the next section as we
describe its cryptographic usefulness.
2.5 Number Magnitudes
A final topic before describing the mathematically difficult problems which will form the
computationally difficult basis for our PRBGs, is the idea of large numbers. We have
already mentioned that one ofthe major advantages ofkeyed crypto-systems is the ability
to increase security as necessary by increasing the size ofthe key. In much the same
way, the usefulness ofour generators can bejncreased by working with larger and larger
numbers. Not only will this increase the security in the algorithms by markedly
increasing the time required to solve the difficult mathematical problems, but it will allow
. .
us to generate a longer sequence ofpseudo-random bits. We will further discuss the
relationship between the size ofthe input and the length ofthe resulting output sequence
ofpseudo-random bits in the last two sections. As was mentioned above, for the
factoring problem, 129 decimal digit numbers, approximately 430 bits, can be factored
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using the current methods of elliptic curve and the two sieves discussed below. In fact
larger numbers have been factored, but not numbers of the type which are most difficult
to factor, composites whose factors are two large primes. Low secuIjty applications
often use numbers whose sizes are approximately 512 bits, or 154 decimal digits.
Commercial grade security employs the use of 1024 or 308 decimal digit numbers, as
numbers ofthis size can be efficiently computed using specialized hardware currently
available. Numbers ofthis size are not likely to be at risk ofbeing factored in general
even using the algorithms which are most effective and efficient currently. The size of
the numbers currently being used for implementations ofthe discrete logarithm problem,
discussed in the next section, are not required to be quite as large to afford the same
level of security.. Although computing power is continually increasing, and the ability to
connect large numbers of powerful computers to attack a single problem is becoming
more and more commonplace, it is in the study and improvement ofthe algorithms which
is more likely to move the line between that which is difficult and therefore secure, and
that which is feasible and no longer sufficient. A closer look at the mathematical
problems and algorithms for their solutions is presented in the next section.
2.6 Random and Pseudo-Random Numbers
We briefly need to discuss the differences between random and pseudo-random numbers.
For our purposes we will focus on random and pseudo-random bit sequences rather than
numbers. Sequences ofboth types must pass statistical tests ensuring that there exists no
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statistical test which is able to predict the next bit in the sequence, even given the entire
previous collection ofbits, with probability greater than one-half. If a such a test can be
,.
found, the sequence is most definitely not random. Yet the differences are most
important to notice. The first is that pseudo-random sequences are generated by a
deterministic algorithm. This is important so that we are able to use a computer, which
at this point in time is solely a deterministic machine, to generate these pseudo-random
sequences. The second difference, related to the first, is that random sequences can not
be reliably reproduced. Ifwe can create a process to generate our supposed random
sequence given a certain input, it fails this important criteria and thus at best falls into the
category ofpseudo-random. A more complete discussion on random and pseudo-
random numbers is given with additional references in Schneier [14] and Knuth [7].
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3. Mathematically Hard Problems
There are various types ofPRBGs, and many ofthem are currently suitable for
cryptographic applications, yet the type presented in this paper will be a sub-type which
can be described as complexity theoretic. This means that the algorithms to break (i.e. to
predict the next bit of) these generators are constrained by a theoretically complex
problem. While there are other possibilities, there are two such main problems which
form the basis for the generators discussed in the next section. The first problem is the
discrete logarithm and the second is that of factoring. Athird problem we will discuss is
that ofquadratic residues; although not the main focus of any ofour PRBGs, requiring a
solution to this problem adds difficulty to attacking some ofthe generators.
3.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm is a wonderfully difficult problem in that the idea is very simple to
state while the algorithms for solving the problem are ingenious and often subtle. The
simple statement is that the problem is to determine c in the equation x=gc, i.e. c=loggx.
We will first look at this problem in the finite field Fp and later will show the differences
when using a different group for the computations as those for the elliptic curve.
3.1.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem over Finite Fields
Though it is not incorrect to'state the problem as above, it is slightly deceiving, that is,
under normal instances, solving for c given x and g would not be a problem worth
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consideration for cryptographic applications. Rather, since this problem is being
considered over the finite field of p-elements, the calculations will be considered over the
finite field ofp elements thus using the mod function, that is, x=gCmod p. This is when
the calculations become worthy of study. The most obvious method for solving this
problem is to start with the value g and ifit is not equal to x, square g; ifx isn't equal to
g2 then multiply by g again to obtain g3. Simply continue this process until you find the
appropriate value c such that it solves the equation x=t. It is important to point out that
we will in fact come across a solution, that is, there aren't an infinite number of
possibilities. This fact is the result ofFermat's Little Theorem discussed in the previous
section, that is, since gP=g, the resulting values ofg raised to a power will in fact repeat
after p-I values. What this means, is that ifafter p-I iterations a solution is not found,
then there is no solution. Although this algorithm will in fact provide a solution if one
exists, it is unacceptably slow with complexity O(p). The applications ofthe discrete log
problem in these PRBGs will be with a p on the order of at least several hundred digits
possibly even several thousand. Even with special hardware to handle integers ofthis
size, the sheer number ofrepetitions required to check every possibility in this brute
force solution reduces this exclusively to a theoretical basis for comparison for the other
algorithms.
The next algorithm for solving this DL problem is called Shank's Algorithm (or
more informally baby-step/giant-step), Menezes [11] and Stinson [16]. The key to .
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understanding this algorithm is the fact that each value in the group can be expressed as
a .m +b, where m = r.JPl and 0<= a,b <= m. While this may not immediately seem
like a relevant fact, by re-writing the DL problem as x=gam+b mod p, it's use may become
clear. Remembering that all calculations are mod p,
am+bx=g
implies
Thus, if all ofthe values for gam are calculated and sorted (as these are only dependent on
the size ofthe field p, and the base g) any value which is a discrete log can be found
simply by calculating xg-bfor 0 s; bs:m and searching for a match in the pre-computed
values of gam above. When the match is found, it is simple to use the two equations
above to work backwards to find the solution to the DL problem. This algorithm is a
great improvement over the brute force method described above. The two tables require
O(m) memory, and the time to find the solution by computing the xg-band searching the
table can be O(m). This provides a trade offwhere some memory is required, but much
time is saved by doing so.
To help to bring the abstract into focus, the following DL problem over Fp will be
solved using each ofthe methods described. Let p=61, and the problem we would like .
to solve be 10g217 (mod p). The first we must calculate
29
so our table size is 8. Next we realize that ever member of this finite field can be
described as a· 8+ b, for 0::; a, b ::; 7. Then we calculate the pairs: (i,28i) for i=O, 1,...7
(0,1) (1,12) (2,22) (3,20)
(4,57) (5,13) (6,34) (7,42).
We then sort this list according to the second coordinate
(0,1) (1,12) (5,13) (3,20)
(2,22) (6,34) (7,42) (4,57).
We then calculate 17·2-; again for i=O, 1, ...,7 until the value calculated matches the
second coordinate ofone of the above values
17·2-0 = 17(mod61)
17.2-1 = 39(mod 61)
17.2-2 = 50(mod 61)
17.2-3 = 25(mod61)
17·2-4 = 43(mod 61)
17.2-5= 52(mod61)
17·2-6 = 26(mod 61)
17.2-7=13(mod 61)
Finally we find a value which matches, so since
17· 2-7 =28.5(mod 61)
then
17 = 28'5+7 = 247 (mod 61).
Therefore the solution to our problem is log217=47. It should be noted that although for
this specific problem we were forced to check each value of i in the second series of
calculations, it could be the fact that a match might be found earlier. Asymptotic analysis
shows that as the size ofourfield grows, we are better suited to calculate all values and
30
sort this second list as well. Checking the two lists becomes O(m) but is only done one
time and is a matching pass rather than a calculation pass.
The next algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem is Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
[11],[16]. This algorithm is the result ofa significant amount ofmathematics, but the
result is an algorithm which can provide significantly better performance. Ifthe problem
to be solved is m=loggx mod p, first notice
k
p-I= I1p;Ci
i=1
where p is the prime ofthe finite field being considered and thus the order, and the k-Pi'S
are all ofthe distinct prime factors ofp-I. The first main idea, is that if m can be
computed mod p/' for every i; then the Chinese Remainder Theorem can be applied to
compute mmod (p-I). The way this is done is by letting q be any Pi such that
(p-l) = 0 mod qC
but
(P-l):;:' 0 mod qc+l
then :3 w such that
and
Then
m=w+ sqc
for some s. And w can be written as
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where the ai, can be determined through a deterministic algorithm. With that, it is clear
that the result is a system ofmodular equations
which can be solved using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The only difficulty is the
deterministic algorithm noted above for finding the ai in the summation notation ofw
above.
Before we explain this algorithm we must prove that the algorithm will always
provide us with the correct values. The first step is to show that
is always true as it will be the main focus ofour algorithm. To begin we re-write the DL
problem
gm = x(modp)
but from above we see that
c
gw+sq == x(mod p)
therefore
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So our statement above we are attempting to show is true if
which is true if and only if
(p -1)(x +sqC) == (p -1)ao (mod p -1).
q q
To show this is always true, look at (
(p-l)(x+sqC) (p-l)ao (p-l)( C )
-=-----''-'--.:;......:;.. - = x + sq - a0
q q q
( 1) c-l
= p- 'Laiqi +sqC -aO
q i=O
and by changing indices we can remove the ao term
= (p -I)'Lai qi-l + sqC-l
== O(modp-l)
therefore we have show original statement always to be true.
We now can describe the algorithm by using that result. First compute,
do = x(p-l)lq (modp)
then we must solve
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simply by iterating ao=O,I,2, ... until the statement is satisfied, which gives us our value of
ao. If our c from the summation equation for w is 1, we are finished, ifnot we can
modify our original DL equation by letting
Xl = xg-aO
so then the equation from above for w now becomes
and by the same argument as in the original DL problem we can write WI in summation
notation with the same values except the lower limit on the summation is increased by
one
c-I
WI = :La;q;
;=1
Now, by the key result we proved above
2 .
Xl(p-l)/q == g(p-l)a1/q (mod p)
so compute d1like before
2d1 = x(p-l)lq (modp)
Then again we calculate
g(p-I);lq (mod p)
fori=O,I,2, ... until
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which means that al= i' which solves the above equation. We repeat this process until
we have solved for all c ofthe ai from our original summation representation ofw. We
have then created the first ofour system ofequations solving our discrete log problem
mod a power of a prime factor ofp-l. By repeating this procedure for each of the prime
factors ofp-l, we have a system ofequations we can use via the Chinese Remainder
Theorem to solve the DL problem mod p. There is some difficulty in addressing the
placement ofthis algorithm in the hierarchy of efficiency. The fact that the number of
operations required to use this technique is based on the size ofthe factors of the order
ofthe group, i.e. p-I implies that if the size ofthe largest factor is large, the algorithm is
no longer an improvement over Shank's Algorithm. The solution requires
time to solve [11]. As you can see, if each ofthe factors Pi are small, than this algorithm
is in fact a significant improvement. If instead, p-l has a large factor, call it Pk than the
order is approximately O(.JP: logpk) which is not better than Shank's algorithm, yet
still a great improvement over or original brute force method.
Now that the description ofthe algorithm is complete, it should help to look at a
small example to illustrate the algorithm. The problem we will solve is the same one we
solved using Shank's Algorithm
log2I7 = a.
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First we must factor p-1
thus we need to generate the three equations
a == bl mod4
a == b2 mod3
a == b3 modS
at which point we can use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to solve for a. First we will
find b] to do so we note that since we will be looking at equations mod 4, and 4=22 that
our solution b] can be written as
It should be noted that these a;'sare those in the summation equation for w above, and
not related to the a as the solution ofthe entire problem in any other way.· We will solve
for ao first. First we will calculate do as
do =xCp-l)lq =1760/2 =1730 mod 61 = 60
then we must find the value ofi such that do= g(p-l)ilq(mod p)
g(p-l)Olq (mod p) = 0
g(p-l)llq(modp) = 60
Since our relation is satisfied for i=l, we know that ao=1. Now we will calculate G] but
to calculate d] we must first calculate x]
XI =x·g-I =17.2-1 =17·31=39(mod61)
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Now we can calculate d] as
but since we again are trying to satisfy the relation d]= g(p-1)i1q (mod p) and we already
have calculated that for ;=1 the result of the left side is 60, again a]=1. We can then
construct our value ofb] as
bl = ao+2a1 = 1+2 .1= 3
so our first equation for the Chinese Remainder Theorem is
a:= 3mod4.
We then proceed to generate the second equation, by calculating d] for our second prime
namely for q=3
d1=x(p-l)lq =1760/3 =1720 =13
Next we again search for the value of; so that the relationship d]= g(p -1)i1q(mod p)
holds
g(p-l)0/\mod61) =1
g(p-l)l/\mod61) = 47
g(p-l)2/\mod61) = 13
So for ;=2 our relationship holds. Since the power of 3 in the factorization ofp-l is only
1, we have constructed our second equation
a :=2mod3.
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Finally we proceed to the generation ofthird and final equation, by calculating d] for our
final prime, namely for q=5
d1 =x(p-1)lq =176015 =1712 =20
Next we again search for the value of i so that the relationship d]= g(p-l)i1q (mod p)
holds
gCp-1)015 (mod 61) = 1
g(p-1)lISCmod61) =9
g(p-1)2/SCmod 61) =20
So again for i=2 our relationship_holds. Since the power of 5 in the factorization of p-l
is only 1, we have constructed our second equation
a == 2mod5.
We now have all three equations we had set out to construct
a == 3mod4
a== 2mod3
a== 2mod5
From this point we can use the Chinese Remainder theorem to solve for our
original discrete log problem. The example ofthe algorithm described to utilize the
Chinese Remainder Theorem presented in the previous section used these equations with
the calculations taken mod 60 as necessary for this problem. The result ofthat example
is 47 leading us to the solution
47 = log217.
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This is the same solutio~ arrived at by Shank's Algorithm shown previously and can be
verified that in fact
247 ::17(mod61).
The final algorithm which attacks this discrete log problem is the index calculus
method [11],[16]. This method is similar to many ofthe powerful composite factoring
algorithms which will be discussed next. We first must choose a factor base, which is a
set ofprimes small relative to the size ofthe field. The first step will be to calculate the
logs of these primes with the correct base in our field. The second step will be to find
the log of any other element to the specified base.
First we must define our collection of primes, let our set ofprimes {Ph P2, ... , Pn}
be the n primes in our factor base. Then to solve for the logs ofthese elements we will
construct a set of congruences. Ifwe notice that
x' aI' a2' a '( d)g , :: PI 'P2 , ... Pn m mo P
can be written equivalently as
To find the log of each ofthese primes, we need only construct enough congruences of
the above type to ensure a unique solution modulo (P-l). The problem becomes finding
powers of our base g which factor into only prime elements in our factor base. This is
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where, in practice, the algorithm can be modified to exploit specific attributes ofthe
hardware and software which will be solving the problem. For instance, by having a
larger factor base, we are more likely to find powers ofour base which can be factored
using only elements in the factor base. On the other hand, we must then also construct
and solve more congruences, as well as store more values for use later in factoring our
arbitrary element. For that reason, this first step is usually carried out as a pre-
computation step, that is, before the algorithm is run, since the base ofthe logarithms
will not be secret, an appropriate factor base can be selected and the logs generated.
Once this is done, the same values for the factor base and their respective logs can be
used for any element to solve the problem for. For a large enough number ofproblems
in the same finite field, and the same logarithm base, this pre-computation step becomes
negligible.
The next step, is to factor our arbitrary number, call it x using this factor base and
the logarithms of its elements. To do this we simply calculate a d such that
d=x·gW(modp)
for some w, and such that d can be factored using only powers ofelements contained in
our selected factor base. Once an appropriate d has been found, we simply note the
congruence
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which like above can be rewritten equivalently using the log function as
Since in our pre-computation step 1, we calculated logg Pi for each i, and the hi were
calculated in factoring our product d, and wis known, we can quickly solve for logg x.
To illustrate this algorithm we will solve the same problem as in the previous two
methods, log2 17 in our finite field of 61 elements. We will limit our factor base to
{2,3,5} since our field is relatively small. First we must perform the pre-calculation step
of the algorithm, that is we must find powers ofour base, 2, which can be factored using
only powers ofelements in our factor base. We find that
28 = 12(mod 61) = 22.3
229 =30(mod61)=2·3·5
since our base is in our selected factor base, we now have enough equations to solve for
the logarithm ofeach. By rewriting the above equations we find
8 == 210g2 2+ log2 3(mod 60)
29 == log2 2+ log2 3+log2 5(mod 60)
and since trivially
we can easily solve for the other two, namely
log23 = 6
log2 5= 22.
41
Now that w~, have completed the pre-computation step, we must find a value for d which
can be factored with our factor base. After trying several values we find that
17· 221 (mod61) == 12 = 22 .3
by taking the logarithm we see that
log2 17 =2log22 + log2 3- 21(mod 60)
and using the logarithms calculated above in the pre-computation step, we see that
log217 = -13 = 47(mod60) .
By checking the other methods, or simply by calculating the exponentiation ofour base
2, we can see that this algorithm yields the correct solution.
It is worth noting that twice, once during the pre-computation, and once to find
the d we were forced to calculate a value for an arbitrary element in our field, and check
to see if it satisfies some property. While this appears imprecise, with a reasonable size
of the factor base, one can generally find appropriate values with only a few unsuccessful
calculations. In our ,example, ifwe added 7 and 11 and 13 to the factor base, nearly
every value can be factored so virtually no unsuccessful calculations are required. Even
with this problem ofdetermining the appropriate size ofthe factor base, and which
elements to include, asymptotic running time for this algorithm has been studied. For
reasonable assumptions for the factor base and field size, the running time for the pre-
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computation phase is O( e(l+O(l))~InplnInp) while the time to calculate an arbitrary
discrete log is O( e(1/2+0(1 ))~ln p In In p ) [16].
3.1.2 The Discrete Logarithm problem over Elliptic Curves
Our discussion ofthe discrete logarithm problem, and the algorithms used to solve it,
thus far have been focused on the discrete logarithm problem over the field Fp. The
other group we will discuss the DL over is that of an elliptic curve. The problem over
this group is slightly different. We do not attempt do utilize some multiplication over
this group, rather we think ofthe discrete logarithm problem as
x = logg m
which instead of studying gX = m, we instead look at
xg=m.
While this appears to be a completely ditferent problem, it is, in fact the same, since, the
operation we defined in the previous section for elliptic curves is addition,. we must
define the discrete logarithm problem in this manner. Ifwe called that operation
multiplication, the DL problem would have the same notation as for Fp•
To understand the DL problem over an elliptic curve, we will now show a small
example ofthe problem. First we must select a curve, for example
y2 =x3 +7,
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we must also select a field to work over, for simplicity we will choose one ofthe form
Fp, and for our example we will choose a smaller field, F11 . We next will find all ofthe
points in the group. This step is not necessary, or even advisable, in practice; our
purpose for this is to make our discussions easier for the explanation ofthe discrete
logarithm problem. The points listed below in (x,y) pairs are
(2,2) (2,9) (3,1) (3,10)
(4,4) (4,7) (5,0) (6,6)
(6,5) (7,3) (7,8) 0
Where 0 indicates the point at infinity discussed in the previous section. We next must
select our g, or our base for the logarithm. Although anyone of our points could be
chosen, with the exception ofthe point at infinity, some ofthe points generate the entire
group and make for a more interesting example. For this reason, we choose g=(4,4).
Since we explained the addition operation over elliptic curves in the previous section we
,
will only present the results here. The notation 2g represents the same as it would in
other types ofelementary algebra, that is 2g=g+g,
19=(4,4)
2g=(6,6)
3g=(2,9)
4g=(3,10)
5g=(7,3)
6g=(5,O)
7g=(7,8)
8g=(3,1)
9g=(2,2)
10g=(6,5)
11g=(4,7)
12g=O.
We must now simply select a DL problem to solve, for example
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where g=(4,4) and b=(2,2). A brute force search would produce x=9 in much the same
way that we generated all ofthe multiples ofg=(4,4).
We will next illustrate Shank's Algorithm simply to show that the two problems
are indeed the same and can be attacked in many ofthe same ways. First we notice that
the order ofthe group is 12. We must first calculate
m=fml=4.
We next solve for s=4g=(3,10), then calculate the original table,
Os=o
1s=(3,1O)
2s=(3,1)
3s=(4,4).
Finally we start to calculate b +(-i)g for i=0,1,2,3 until a match is found in the above
table
b + (-0)g=(2,2)
b +(-1)g=(3,1)
for which we see that a match is with 2s. So, we put together our information to see
that
b+(-1)g=8·g
or
b=9g.
By checking the table above we can see that indeed, 9(4,4)=(2,2).
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Thus we have illustrated that Shank's algorithm does still solve this problem. We
could similarly show this for the Pohlig-Hellman method. When solving the DL problem
over an elliptic curve using the Pohlig-Hellman method, we must keep in mind that the .
first step is factoring the order ofthe cyclic group. We mentioned in the previous
section that a deterministic algorithm created by Schoofcalculates the order of the points
on an elliptic curve, and noted that in a complexity theoretical sense it is an efficient
method. Yet, when solving for the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves over
large prime fields, we find that this step of calculating order requires significant overhead
which must be incurred before the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can even be used. There is
an even more significant problem when we try to use the Index Calculus method. There
is no way to extend this method, in general, to any group or even to all elliptic curves in
general. In fact, as ofyet, there is no technique to solve the DL problem over all groups
(or even all elliptic curves) which works in sub-exponential time. There is the
significant exception for the supersingular curves as des,?ribed in the previous section. In
[8], Koblitz notes that this collection ofcurves is susceptible to a specialized attack
which is more efficient to those applicable to any cyclic group. Thus, although for this
group ofcurves, it is much simpler to compute the order, and thus choose a curve which
is most suited to resist attacks like Pohlig-Hellman, by selecting a curve whose order has
a large prime factor, it is not advisable to use one of this type for actual cryptographic
applications as it could be attacked by this alternate, specialized method. It is for these
two reasons, that using elliptic curves over a finite field, is becoming the most widely
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studied version ofthe problem. In truth, elliptic curves over finite fields have only
recently been studied for this purpose. It is unreasonable to believe that no further
progress can be made, but as current research and algorithms remain, to use-elliptic
curves provides a more difficult problem than over a finite field alone.
The methods discussed to attack the Discrete Logarithm problem illustrate
several important facts. The first is from a practical standpoint, we have noted that the
most efficient algorithms for solving the Discrete Logarithm problem over any cyclic
group require the complete factorization ofthe order ofthe group to be comprised of
only small integers. By choosing an order with at least one large factor, we can ensure
that the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is as inefficient as possible. The second important
fact is to realize that for our cryptographic applications we can, indeed ensure that the
cyclic groups chosen possess the structure necessary to prevent any known methods
from being able to easily attack the problem. This is not to say that some new method
will not be developed which could add another requirement to ensure the problem is as
difficult as possible to solve. On the contrary, we must keep in mind, that although some
ofthe algorithms which can solve various ofour problems, can be quite efficient, they
often require a certain structure to be so. By careful construction, we can usually force
the algorithms to work with worst case conditions.
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3.2 The Factoring Problem
The next mathematical problem from which many ofthese PRBGs draw their strength is
the problem offactoring composite numbers. Although the problem offactorillg numbers
is used in many cryptographic applications, we will not spend as much time on the
techniques of solving this problem as we have on the problem ofdiscrete logarithms. To
state the problem more specifically, let n be the composite number, the problem is to find
Pi and at such that
m
n = I1 pja; .
j=!
As we stated before, for our purposes, and most of those ofcryptographic importance,
we are looking to solve
n=p·q
where p and q are two prime numbers. Much like the problem ofdiscrete logs, there is a
simple brute force method one can use to solve the factoring problem. That is, one can
simply divide our composite number nby each number less than n. There is an obvious
improvement to this simple algorithm which greatly improves efficiency, that is to note
that only the numbers less than or equal to the square root ofn need to be checked. If
no numbers less than the square root evenly divide n it must be a prime, because if
n = p. q and p >.fii then q < .fii .
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There is another marked improvement which can be made, and that is to check
only the primes less than .J1i. This seems like it should be more difficult, since ~e
would first have to determine if each number is a prime before checking if it evenly
divides our composite number n. In fact, this is not difficult at all and the technique has
a name, the sieve ofEratosthenes. The idea is to write down every number less than n.
Start with the first prime 2, and cross off all multiples oftwo on the list: 4,6,8.... Then
look for the smallest number which is larger than 2 which has not· been crossed off, in
this case 3. We repeat the process with 3, crossing offmultiples of3: 6,9,12, .... We
again look for the next smallest prime, which would be 5. This process is continued until
you check the number r,J;;l. The numbers remaining are the only primes less than n.
By simply checking each ofthese, we can improve the efficiency. Although this is quite
a good technique for factoring small numbers, the size ofnumbers used for
cryptographic applic.ations are often larger than 300 decimal digits. Storing a table for
each integer less than some n in this context would require a prohibitably large amount
ofmemory, and checking each ofthe numbers would require far too much time. We
must attempt to find other techniques for factoring numbers.
One interesting technique can be best demonstrated by looking at a small
example. If the number we needed to factor was 377, we could notice that 377 is the
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difference ofthe two numbers 441 and 64. Ifwe further notice that 441=21 2 and 64=82
then we can rewrite 377 as
377 =441- 64 =212 - 82 =(21- 8)(21 +8) =13·29.
Thus we have managed to factor our composite number 377 by simply finding two
perfect squares whose difference is equal to our composite. This technique can solve
some harder problems, but the difficulty in finding two perfect squares whose difference
is equal to a specific composite number, is a non-trivial task. For this reason, this
technique is rarely used for the factoring ofcryptographically useful composite numbers.
The next technique is called Pollard's p-1 method [16]. This is the first ofthe techniques
which require the input ofanother number which serves as a bound much in the same
way that our factor,base was necessary for the Index Calculus method for solving the
discrete logarithm problem. We begin with our number n which we would like to factor
and we have the input value for the bound B to work from. We begin by calculating
a == 2B!(modn)
we then find the greatest common divisor (gcd), which Euclid's algorithm from the
previous section can solve
d = gcd(a-I, n) .
If our number d is larger than one and not equal to n we have found that d is a factor of
n.
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The proof is rather simple and relies on only three main points, for notation we
.
will assume thatp is a factor ofour number n. First we note that
since pin. The second important fact is Fermat's Small theorem discussed in the previous
section which in our case implies that
Zp-1 == I(modp).
As we noted before, (p-I)IB!, so we can see that
a == I(modp)
Finally, the final main mathematical point is that if
pl(a -1) and pin
then
plgcd(a -I,n).
The key to this technique, is that there exists a factor p of our number n such that (P-I)
has only small factors (i.e., those less than our bound B). With this in mind, for
cryptographic applications which rely on the factoring problem as the basis for its
security, the two large primesp and q must be chosen so that one less than each has at
least one large factor. By choosing these primes this way, we can render this attack
inefficient.
The next three algorithms for factoring numbers have been designed to factor
very large numbers. Some examples are the very famous RSA-I29 number which was
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generated with the advent of the RSA encryption method which was expected to
withstand years offactoring attempts. The three advanced algorithms are the quadratic
sieve, the elliptic curve and the number field sieve. The running times ofeach are
presented below [16],
quadratic sieve
elliptic curve
number field sieve
O(e(l+o(1».Jlnnlnlnn)
O(e(1+O(1»~21nplnlnp )
(192+o(1»(lnn )1/3(lnlnn)2/3O(e . )
wherep is the smallest prime factor ofn. It should be noted, that ifp represents the
smallest prime, the elliptic curve method finds a single factor ofthe composite number.
Ifthis algorithm is to be used to completely factor a composite number, then p represents
the second largest prime factor. The composite numbers ofcryptographic interest are
the product oftwo primes of similar size; and for this type ofnumber, the second largest
prime factor is, in fact, the smallest prime factor. The difference between the sieving
algorithms and the elliptic curve method, is that the running time for the sieving
algorithms depends only on the size ofthe composite number, whereas the running time
for the elliptic curve method depends on the smallest factor ofthe composite number.
Through the expressions for running time above, we might expect that the quadratic
sieve and the elliptic curve algorithms would run in the same time for these types of
cryptographic numbers, yet the constants represented by 0(1) have great impact on the
actual running time. In practice, for composite numbers ofcryptographic interest, the
sieving algorithms typically outperform the elliptic curve method. The other interesting
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aspect of the elliptic curve method, is that the technique requires searching for an elliptic
curve whose order can be completely factored by powers of small primes. It is exactly
this type of elliptic curve that we aim to avoid in choosing a curve for which the discrete
logarithm problem is difficult. It is in this way that the two mathematically difficult
problems are related. More information on the two sieving algorithms, quadratic and
number field, can be found in Pomerance's article [12], and more information on the
elliptic curve method can be found in Lenstra's paper [9].
3.3 Quadratic Residues
The last difficult problem that we will mention is that ofquadratic residues. A discussion
ofthe problem is found in the paper by Blum, Blum and Shub [2]. We briefly discussed
quadratic residues in the previous section and will present the problem they can present,
but we will limit our discussion to the specific situations which arise in our study of
PRBGs. We will study quadratic residues in the following situation, let n be the product
oftwo distinct odd primes, then let Zn* represent the multiplicative group of integers
mod n as described in the previous section. We find that exactly one fourth ofthe
elements in this multiplicative group will be a quadratic residue. The problem is to
determine if a given element ofthe group is in this set of quadratic residues. As always
there is a brute force solution, calculate cl for each element a in our group Zn*. The
solutions for the quadratic residue problem, are split into two types. If the n is a prime
number, then there are techniques which can be used to efficiently attack the quadratic
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residue problem. If instead, n is a composite number, as will be the case for our study,
each ofthe algorithms require a complete factorization ofn before beginning the
algorithm. For this reason, we will not dwell on this groblem, for although it is an _
important problem, the factoring aspect forces this problem to be at least as hard as that
offactoring, therefore it is sufficiently difficult for our needs.
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4. Theory of Cryptographically Strong Pseudo-Random Bit Generators
In this section we will begin by describing ordinary pseudo-random bit generators, we
~ll t~en spe~ify requ!remeIl~which w~en satisfied by these ordinary_Qseudg-random_bit
generators allow them to be considered cryptographically strong. The types ofbit
generators we are most interested in are those with an iterative implementation. The
basic idea is to start with some input string, and convert it into a pseudo-random output
string ofgreater length.
4.1 Definition of a Pseudo-Random Bit Generator
A pseudo-random bit generator Gk is a mapping
Gk:{O,I}k ~ {0,1}/
where k and I are positive integers, {0,1}a represents any a-bit binary string, and
P(k) = I
where P(k) is a polynomial function [16]. The idea is to express that the generator maps
random input strings into pseudo-random output strings which are longer than the input.
The generator Ok is comprised of several mappings which depend upon a set Ik
called the instance space. An element in the instance space is called an instance or an
"instance of the generator". The first mapping is Sk which maps our initial input string
into the instance space
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Sk:{O,I}k ~ I k .
A simple illustration ofthe mapping Sk is given in section 5.1. The second mapping is a
function fkwhich is the iterative portion ofour generator, and which maps the instance
space to itself
As an example, in one ofthe generators discussed in the next section, Ik are the points on
an elliptic curve and fk is a computationally defined permutation ofthese points. The
third function maps the instance space to a pseudo-random output string
vk:1k ~ {O,I}b
where b is the number ofbits which can be generated from each instance and added to
the pseudo-random output string. For most ofthe generators we will study in the next
section, this value b will be the value 1, that is, for each iteration ofthe functionjk, only
one bit will be added to the output string. For the rest ofthis paper, we will drop the
subscript k from our mappings and refer to them as simply s, f, and v.
Using this modified notation we will next describe how the three functions work
together to produce our pseudo-random bit string. Ifwe consider a random bit-string
input, r, we will use our first function S to generate the first instance for iteration
Xo = s(r).
We then will use our iterating function to generate the sequence of instances
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Xi =j(xi-l)'
Finally we use our bit-string extracting function v on each ofthe instances to generate
our output bit-string
v(Xl-l)V(XI-2}" v(xl)v(xO)'
The length ofthe output string can be any number less than or equal to that defined by
our value I=P(k).
4.2 Requirements for Cryptographic Strength
We will now describe some ofthe requirements for one ofour PRBGs to be
cryptographically strong. Before we begin, we must make note ofanother function
which some theorems will make use that is merely the combination oftwo mappings
b(x) =vj-I(X).
The idea, is while s,j ,and v should be easy to calculate (i.e. polynomial time) in order
for G to be considered,a PRBG, b should not be. We recall that the functionjfor our
generators will be one ofour mathematically difficult problems presented in the previous
section. Since the function v should be able to be computed quickly, for b to be
difficult, j-I must be difficult, i.e. inverting or solving the problem upon whichjis based
should be a complexity theoretic difficult problem.
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4.2.1 Statistical Tests
We start by discussing statistical tests. The statistical tests should be run on the output
string, as opposed to the instances. One might want to begin by some very elementary
statistical tests such as counting the number ofO's and I's to ensure that the occurrences
of each is the same for random inputs. Yet, by passing such a simple test, it would be
hard to immediately classify the output as indistinguishable from random input. In fact,
no matter how sophisticated the statistical tests become that any generator passes, it is
conceivable that the very next test constructed would distinguish between our pseudo-
random output and random data. What we must ensure is that every statistical test
which runs in polynomial time is unable to distinguish our pseudo-random data from
random data. The idea ofpassing an arbitrary statistical test is found in most papers
discussing PRBGs including Blum and Micali [3] and Kaliski [5]. We define an arbitrary
statistical test T that runs in polynomial time which outputs a 0 or a I with the input ofa
bit string. Passing all s~ch tests requires that for sufficiently large bit-strings, Twill
output a I with the same probability whether the input string is chosen from a random
source, or from the PRBG being tested. More precisely for sufficiently large k
1IPr[T(G(x» = 1] - Pr[T(x') = 1]1 ~ -
P(k)
where P(k) is a polynomial function and G(x) is the output string from our PRBG and x'
is a random string ofthe appropriate length.
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4.2.2 Next Bit Tests
While the above test is concerned with entire output string compared to random output
strings, this test is concerned with the prediction of the next bit in the pseudo-random
sequence given the previous bits generated. We must ensure, that the probability of
predicting the next bit ofthe generator by one ofthe polynomial time statistical tests T
from above is not significantly greater than 1/2. More precisely we can state that
1 1
Pr[T(G(x)[i i-I]) = G(x)i]::;; -.+-
, 2 P(k)
where again P(k) is a polynomial function, and x is our random input, [3] and [5].
4.3 Sufficient Conditions for Cryptographic Strength
We will state the three conditions which are sufficient for a PRBG to be considered
cryptographically strong. The proofofthe sufficiency is given in Blum and Micali [3].
The three necessary conditions are accessibility, stability, and unapproximability. The
first condition ofaccessibility requires that given a random input string r the mapping
s(r), which is the first step in the generator, selects an element from the instances
uniformly in polynomial time. More precisely
1 1
Pr[s(r) =Xo =-Ilkl ::;; P(k)llkl
where Xo Elk and IAI is the number of instances. The second condition, stability, states
that the iterated function/is a permutation ofthe instances inlk, or more precisely
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If(x)I=lxl·
The addition of the constraint thatfl..x) be computable in polynomial time is often added,
although our statement at the outset ofthis discussion concerning the three mappings of
our generator noticed that for G to be run in polynomial time, each ofthe three mappings
must also run in polynomial time. The third sufficient condition unapproximability, states
that our mapping b can not be predicted in much the same way the statistical tests were
shown effective
1 1Pr[C(x) = b(x)] ~ - +-
2 P(k)
where C(x) is any polynomial time mapping from instances into bit strings ofthe
appropriate size.
When all three ofthese conditions have been met, we have ensured not only a
cryptographically strong PRBG, but a Blum-Micali pseudo-random bit generator. Work
has been done to consider conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, and these
results are discussed in Kaliski [5]. This work allows for the construction ofPRBG
which are cryptographically strong, yet do not rely on functionsf which are uninvertable
for every instance. Though this result may prove useful in constructing future
cryptographically strong PRBGs, the generators that we will discuss in the next section
are all ofthe Blum-Micali type. Although we discussed the statistical test and the next
bit test, our three conditions do not appear to make use ofthese results. In their paper
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[3] Blum and Micali prove that the three conditions stated above, necessarily give rise to
generators which·produce output which satisfies these two tests. This is an important
result, as the sufficient conditions stated above are more easily validated than the
statistical tests.
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5. Construction of Cryptographically Strong PRBGs.
While we set forth a set of conditions which are sufficient for cryptographic strength of
PRBGs in the previous section, we would now like to study examples of such
generators. We will restrict ourselves to generators which are ofthe Blum-MicaH type
satisfying the three conditions for cryptographic strength presented in the previous
section.
5.1 Blum-Blum-Shub Generator
We will start our discussion ofthe construction ofcryptographically strong PRBGs by
describing one ofthe first generators constructed, one which is still in use today both in
practice and as a benchmark by which newly constructed generators are compared. This
generator was first described in Blum, Blum and Shub [2], and is thus called the Blum-
Blum-Shub (or BBS) generator, and the strength ofthe algorithm uses aspects ofall
three computationally difficult problems discussed in the above section: factoring, the
discrete logarithm, and quadratic residues. We will start with the description ofthe
various mappings and functions which comprise the generator and then show that the
conditions are met classifying the generator as cryptographically strong. All ofthe
calculations for this generator are on ZN· the multiplicative group of integers modulo N,
which is defined in section 2.1, but for this application, N is restricted to be ofthe form
N = p' q with p and q are both primes such that
p =q =3(mod4).
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simply the points p in the group over our elliptic curve, where p=(x,y). We now can
define our functionJ as
J(p) =h(p)g
where
h(p) ={Y ~ P =(x,y)
p if p=O
recalling that 0 represents the point at infinity. Similarly, we must take some care in
constructing an appropriate mapping for v as well. In [5], it is shown that v can be
defined as
if P=O
if P = (x, y) and y ~ (p +1) /2.
otherwise
To illustrate this generator we will work through a small example. We will use
the same elliptic curve and finite field as we did for the example of the discrete logarithm
problem in the earlier section. The curve we selected was
and the finite field we were working over was F11, so the elements ofthe group, and
therefore instances ofthe generator are ofthe form p=(x,y), such that x,y E Zp. We
found that the element g=(4,4) generates the cyclic group oforder 12. To begin the
algorithm, we must establish the initial instance, we shall assume that the element (7,8)
72
was chosen at random as the seed so Xo=(7,8). We now begin the iterative portion ofthe
algorithm to generate the instances ofthe generator
Xl =f(xQ) =8g =(3,1)
similarly we can generate the rest ofthe instances
X2 =!(xI) =Ig =(4,4)
x3 =!(x2) =4g =(3,10)
x4 =f(x3) =109 =(6,5)
Xs = f(x4) =5g =(7,3)
x6 =f(xs) =3g =(2,9)
x7 =f(x6) =9g =(2,2)
Xs =f(x7) =2g =(6,6)
x9 =!(xs) =6g =(15,0)
xlO =f(x9) =Og = 0
Xu =f(xlO) =l1g =(4,7).
We notice here that since the entire group is oforder 12, we can no longer continue to
iterate to generate more instances. We now must extract the bits from the instances, we
first calculate the value for partitioning the instances
(p+l) = (11+1) =6
2 2
thus, for the point at infinity and any points whose y coordinate is greater than or equal
to 6, the corresponding bit value will be one. The values for the bits are
Q,b2, ... ,Q2 =1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1, 1.
Therefore the resulting output bit string is 110101001001.
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The main result from [5] is that a generator defined in this way over an elliptic
curve, satisfies the conditions sufficient for classification as a Blum-MicaH generator.
We will now note the changes required for arbitrary elliptic curves to be used as opposed
to limiting ourselves to those ofthe type ofthe simple case. The problem in using the
general case is that it requires two such elliptic curves where the second is referred to as
the Tate twist ofthe first curve [5]. Using general curves as the basis for a pseudo-
random number generator avoids a reduction of the discrete logarithm problem for the
elliptic curve to that ofthe finite field, Menezes [11].
When comparing all ofthe generators discussed, it is important to differentiate between
theoretical and practical differences. The differences between the PRBG using discrete
logarithms over an elliptic curve and the PRBG using discrete logarithms over a finite
field, are largely practical. They are theoretically the same generator. The only
theoretical difference, is related to the attacks on the discrete logarithm problem in the
two groups. We noted that the Index Calculus method for solving discrete logarithms in
a Finite Field has not been modified to solve such problems over an elliptic curve. It is
conjectured that, in fact, any technique to solve the discrete logarithm problem over
elliptic curves efficiently, (i.e. sub-exponential), will require an entirely new technique,
based on further study ofthe structure ofthe groups generated by these elliptic curves.
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The main result connecting all ofthese generators, is that the sufficient conditions
for a Blum-Micali PRBG are often not difficult to prove, providing a function!can be
constructed which is not invertible in polynomial time. This is not to say that this
requirement can replace the three sufficient conditions, yet it is one aspect which can
ease in constructing a PRBG.
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Conclusion
The announcement pertaining to.the cracking ofthe Netscape security system, brought
to public attention the fact that creating and implementing secure encryption systems is
more difficult than a simple function call. Many modern encryption techniques require
higher mathematics and impressive amounts ofcomputing power. Even the perfect
security provided by one-time pad, requires significant planning on the acquiring of the
random numbers required to afford the method any security at all. Pseudo-random bit
generators can be in integral step in increasing the level of security in both of these and
many other applications. What is most important to note concerning the set of
generators discussed, is the fact that the security of each is based upon a mathematically
difficult problem. Even more noteworthy is the fact that these problems are not esoteric
or obscure in any way; they are problems which have been studied for centuries and
upon which significant progress has been made. The type ofuninvertable function
required to base the security ofa PRBG on is fairly well defined, and any other functions
ofthis type could be shown to provide equal or better security.
Through the study ofcomplexity theoretic PRBGs we iniplemented each ofthe
systems discussed in the previous section. We made no attempt to make use ofthe
strengths ofthe platforms we conducted our test on, and the tests were straightforward
implementations ofthe algorithms presented. We were able to generate the
cryptographically strong bits as expected and the only limits ofthe flexibility ofthe
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generators with respect to the size ofthe numbers used, were only those presented by
the amount of memory and disk space on the machines. In our testing, we discovered an
obstacle which could lower the security in certain cases ofthe generators. Occasionally
we would inadvertently select initial conditions which provided short cycles ofpseudo-
random bits. By short cycles ofpseudo-random bits, we mean that the iterating function
jin our generator repeats for smaller, often much smaller, values than we would like.
One problem is that we are dealing with numbers which are too small for cryptographic
purposes and expecting to extrapolate that information onto applications using much
larger numbers. Although we did not search for this problem in fields of 500 bits or
larger, which would be those used for cryptographic applications, we were limited by
memory and disk space.
One ofthe smaller examples ofthe problem is presented here concerning the
discrete logarithm generator over finite fields. Ifwe choose as our prime p=20011, we
can find that the element 12 generates the corresponding cyclic group oforder 20010.
By selecting random elements and iterating our functionjuntil the original value is
calculated as a result, we can explicitly find the lengths ofthese cycles ofthe permutation
given byf The first column is the smallest element used to generate the corresponding
~
cycle and the second column is the cycle length.
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1: 8825
8: 6296
9: 1960
38: 1148
17: 818
14: 526
86: 330
208: 80
404: 26
6571: 1
Since the number ofbits required to express the prime for our field, 20011, is 14 bits, as
long as each cycle produces more than 14 bits the definition ofthe pseudo random bit
generator is satisfied. As you can see the element 6571 has a cycle 1 and obviously fails
this requirement since
126571 = 6571
using the exponentiation over our finite field. Ifwe selected this element as our seed
value, our pseudo-random string would be a string composed entirely of 1s. Other
examples were found for which more than one element failed this requirement.
After reproducing this issue for other generators, we looked to current research
on PRBGs for an explanation or a possible solution. Work mentioned in [5] and [15]
show that the probability ofselecting a cycle short enough to render the generator
insecure becomes very small as the size of the groups becomes large. It is still possible,
in general, to inadvertently select one ofthese short cycles. Some preliminary work has
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been done to modify the BBS-generator so as to prevent elements having short cycles
from being selected in any cases. Although this is not a significant concern from a
theoretical standpoint, from that of implementation, having the probability close to zero
for selecting one ofthese short cycles is not a strong enough condition to rely on the
security ofa crypto-system using such a generator. This area of short cycles ofbits, is
one which is currently being and must continue to be investigated. Addressing this
problem could very well be the final step in assuring that the generation of pseudo-
random bits ofthe type discussed in this paper are cryptographically secure enough to
satisfy the conditions necessary for use for key generation for public encryption crypto-
systems and for the one-time pad.
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